# audi Arabia:The volume & cost of printing the free books by Ministry of education – GradSchoolPapers.com

audi Arabia:The volume & cost of printing the free books by Ministry of education
Current Situation:
– Volume of books and expected volumes in the five years
– Breakdown of costs (for each school category) and with expected increase in the future
– What happens to these books after the end of the year (or semester)
– The culture issue and the image left behind when people sees books thrown on streets (add some pictures)
– Most importantly many schools books have the name of almighty ALLAH written in them
– Environmental impact (number of trees needed for these books, .. etc)
– Etc.
For your Info, The ministry each semster print and distribute books free of charges to all students and schools .
Econ 418, Fall 2015
Problem Set 5
Due Dec 5 (Sat) 2 pm
Problem 1 (Basic)
Represent as a game tree, the two-player extensive game with perfect information in which the terminal
histories are (C, E), (C, F), (D, G), and (D, H), the player function is given by P(Ø)=1 and P(C)=P(D)=2,
player 1 prefers (C, F) to (D, G) to (C, E) to (D, H), and player 2 prefers (D, G) to (C, F) to (D, H) to (C,
E).
The political figures Rosa and Ernesto have to choose either Berlin (B) or Havana (H) as the location for
a party congress. They choose sequentially. A third person, Karl, determines who chooses first. Rosa
prefers the outcome in which both she and Ernesto choose B to that in which they both choose H, and
prefers this outcome to either of the ones in which she and Ernesto choose different actions; she is
indifferent between these last two outcomes. Ernesto’s preferences differ from Rosa’s in that the roles of
B and H are reversed. Karl’s preferences are the same as Ernesto’s. Model this situation as an extensive
game with perfect information. Use the game tree format.
a. What are the strategies of the players in the following entry game?
b. What are Rosa’s strategies in Problem 2?
Challenger
In Out
Incumbent
Acquiesce Fight
2, 1 0, 0
1, 2
Problem 4 (Basic)
a. Find the Nash equilibria for the game described in Problem 1.
b. Find the Nash equilibria for the following game.
For the following game:
a. Write the normal form representation.
b. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria.
c. Determine which of these Nash equilibria is subgame-perfect.
1
C D
2
E F
3, 1
2, 0
G H
1
1, 2 0, 0
2
1
Y Z
2
L R
X
2, 2
L R
3, 1 0, 0 5, 0 0, 1